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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Self-control is viewed in economics and other disciplines as a key individual characteristic 
responsible for effective self-regulation and personal goal attainment. Economists model 
self-control problems through time-inconsistent preferences. The underlying assumption 
of the model is that agents have a “present bias” toward current consumption, as the 
value of all future rewards are downweighed relative to rewards in the present. 
Empirical tests of these preferences largely rely on experimental elicitation methods 
using monetary rewards, with several recent studies failing to find present bias for money. 
In this paper, in a within-subjects longitudinal experiment, we compare estimates of 
present bias for money with estimates for healthy and unhealthy foods. Our sample 
consists of 697 low-income Chinese high school students, a group that not only departs 
from the university student sample which has been widely studied in prior studies, but 
also in their age. Self-control established early in life is critical to personal development, 
yet few studies to date have estimated time preferences in children and adolescents. Our 
sample is also unique in their socio-economic status. One reason why recent carefully 
designed studies do not find present bias for money may simply be that the participants 
with higher income, as some studies document, did not have serious problems of self-
control to begin with.  
We find strong present bias for both food and money. On average, subjects choose to 
receive 4.2% (7%) more food (money) on the sooner payment date when the decision is 
made on that day than when it is made in advance. We see individual measures of time 
preferences are moderately correlated across reward types. Our experimental measures 
of time preferences over money predict field behaviours (including BMI, alcohol 
consumption, smoking, and academic performance) better than preferences elicited over 
foods. 
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ABSTRACT 
Economists model self-control problems through time-inconsistent preferences. Empirical 
tests of these preferences largely rely on experimental elicitation methods using 
monetary rewards, with several recent studies failing to find present bias for money. In 
this paper, we compare estimates of present bias for money with estimates for healthy 
and unhealthy foods. In a within-subjects longitudinal experiment with 697 low-income 
Chinese high school students we find strong present bias for both money and food, and 
that individual measures of present bias are moderately correlated across reward types. 
Our experimental measures of time preferences over money predict field behaviours 
better than preferences elicited over foods. 
Keywords: self-control; quasi-hyperbolic discounting; present bias; adolescents; food 
rewards 
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Introduction 
Self-control is viewed in economics and other disciplines as a key individual characteristic 
responsible for effective self-regulation and personal goal attainment. Lack of self-control 
is thought to explain suboptimal choices and outcomes in many life domains, including 
financial decision making, health, and education. Given the importance of self-control, this 
individual trait is widely studied theoretically and empirically in many different fields.  
In the economics literature, researchers usually model problems of self-control through 
time-inconsistent preferences that predict choices such as planning to go on a diet from 
next Friday but not going on the diet when next Friday arrives. Two well-known models that 
can capture such behaviours are the hyperbolic (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) and quasi-
hyperbolic (Laibson, 1997) discount models. The latter model has attractive analytical 
features that have contributed to its popularity in economics,1 and for this reason we focus 
on it in our paper. The underlying assumption of the model is that agents have a “present 
bias” toward current consumption, as the value of all future rewards are downweighed 
relative to rewards in the present, in addition to the standard exponential discounting of 
delayed rewards. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting has been applied theoretically and 
empirically to explain problematic behaviours across a wide variety of domains.  
In the financial domain, quasi-hyperbolic discounting has been used to explain suboptimal 
life-cycle consumption, savings, and borrowing behaviours. Even in many developed 
countries, people do not save enough for retirement: in the US, the median savings of a 
household approaching retirement was only USD$15,000, compared to median annual 
expenditure of USD$36,800 ( Federal Reserve Board, 2016). This means that a median 
household approaching retirement had enough saved to last less than 5 months. Such low 
levels of savings can be explained by present-biased consumption, as the trade-off between 
earlier or later consumption is more heavily skewed toward early consumption when the 
decision is made in the present than when the decision is planned in advance (Jones & 
Mahajan, 2015).  
 
 
1 See Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) for a comprehensive review of early 
literature. 
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In the health domain, economists have applied quasi-hyperbolic discounting to explain 
behaviours that lead to undesired outcomes such as obesity, unhealthy eating habits, and 
too little exercise. For example, DellaVigna & Malmendier (2006) found that gym users pay 
much more for gym facilities than what they actually use, a finding that can be explained 
through present-biased time preference: people overestimate their future gym attendance, 
but in the present moment choose not to go to the gym resulting in less usage than planned. 
Time inconsistency has also been used to explain addiction: Gruber & Kőszegi (2001) show 
that preferences with respect to smoking are time inconsistent, as individuals find that they 
are unable to quit despite their best intention to do so, while Schilbach (2019) finds that 
low-income workers in India are willing to forgo substantial monetary payments to set 
incentives for themselves to remain sober.  
In the domain of work effort, time inconsistent preferences can explain why we end up 
working less than we intend to. When we plan our work effort for tomorrow, we make a 
trade-off between the disutility of working and the benefits that work brings. When 
tomorrow arrives, the costs of work suddenly weigh more heavily while the benefits remain 
in the future. This leads to procrastination. In a field experiment with Indian data entry 
workers, Kaur, Kremer, & Mullainathan (2015) find that workers show present bias as 
evidenced by effort increasing closer to randomly assigned paydays. Augenblick, Niederle, 
& Sprenger (2015) also find present bias in the allocation of work in a laboratory experiment. 
While researchers have applied time inconsistency to explain self-control problems in many 
domains, most experimental research aimed at quantifying present bias has focused on a 
single specific reward, namely money,2 so we do not know whether we would obtain the 
same results for other rewards. Moreover, much of what we have learned from these 
experiments has involved students at research universities. University students are 
relatively homogenous and have made decisions that were good enough to place them at 
university. It seems that we have largely been studying self-control in those who have most 
of it. Further, the bulk of existing experimental studies use a cross-sectional design,3 but as 
Halevy (2015) and Read, Frederick, & Airoldi (2012) note this design is not a true test of 
time-inconsistency. Only a longitudinal design permits a test of inconsistent planning, the 
 
2 For a comprehensive review, see Cohen et al. (2020). 
3 A cross-sectional design compares, at a single point in time, preferences between two or more 
pairs of temporal prospects, separated by a common interval but preceded by different front-end 
delays. 
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key prediction of the quasi-hyperbolic model (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 
2002). We address each of these issues in our paper. 
In this paper, we estimate and compare time preferences for money, healthy foods and 
unhealthy foods. We thus contribute to the literature by identifying the shape of time 
preferences for food rewards. While researchers have applied the quasi-hyperbolic model 
to explain behaviour across a variety of domains, several recent experimental studies find 
no present bias for money (Andersen et al., 2014; Andreoni, Kuhn, & Sprenger, 2015; 
Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012a; Augenblick, Niederle, & Sprenger, 2015). This raises two 
possibilities: either our model of many real-life phenomena that rely on self-control is 
wrong, or the estimates of that model are domain- or subject pool specific. To our best 
knowledge, only one study has to date compared present bias for money with another 
reward type: Augenblick, Niederle, & Sprenger (2015) find little present bias in monetary 
choices and considerably more for real effort, illustrating how present bias may differ across 
domains.  
With regard to other economic preferences, it has been found that people tend to be less 
patient (as distinct from present biased) for primary rewards than for money (Estle, Green, 
Myerson, & Holt, 2007; Odum & Rainaud, 2003; Reuben, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2010; 
Tsukayama & Duckworth, 2010; Ubfal, 2016) but that risk preferences estimated for money 
and food rewards are essentially the same (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). These contrasting 
results for different preferences across domains, highlight the importance of considering 
each economic preference in each domain separately.  
Another unique feature of this paper is that our sample consists of 697 relatively poor 
adolescents in China. Most previous studies have focused on university students, the so 
called WEIRD subject pool (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). WEIRD refers to samples 
drawn from populations that are White, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic. One 
reason why recent carefully designed studies do not find present bias for money may simply 
be that the participants, having been admitted into top universities, did not have serious 
problems of self-control to begin with.  
Our subjects depart not only from each of the dimensions of the WEIRD samples, but also in 
their age. Self-control established early in life is critical to personal development, yet few 
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studies to date have estimated time preferences in children and adolescents.4 Research in 
psychology has shown that poor self-control in childhood is associated with a range of 
damaging behaviours, for example cigarette smoking. Moreover, children with greater self-
control are significantly more likely to be from socioeconomically advantaged families 
(Moffitt, Poulton, & Caspi, 2013).  
To identify present bias we conduct a longitudinal experiment in schools. Halevy (2015) 
distinguishes three properties of standard preferences over temporal payments relative to 
a dated collection of such preferences. Stationarity implies that the ranking of two temporal 
payments at time t depends only on the difference between the two payments and their 
relative delay. The standard cross-sectional design is a test of this property. Time invariance 
implies that preferences are not a function of calendar time. Time consistency requires that 
the ranking of temporal payments does not change as the evaluation perspective changes 
from t to t’. Only a true longitudinal design can test for this property. Halevy (2015) finds 
that people can be time inconsistent and have stationary preferences at the same time, 
implying that the results of a cross-sectional design may be misleading.  
Finally, conducting our experiment in school allows us to avoid selection into the study as 
well as attrition from it. Further, with access to administrative data from schools, we test 
the ability of our experimental measures to predict field outcomes such as academic 
performance.  
697 Chinese high-school students participated in a five-week, incentivised longitudinal 
experiment5 using a modified version of the Convex Time Budget design (Andreoni & 
Sprenger, 2012a) to elicit individual preferences for three reward types: money, healthy 
food and unhealthy food. Subjects faced the same set of decisions, featuring the same 
reward amounts delivered on the same dates, at two points in time. In the first session, all 
choices involved rewards to be received at two dates in the future, while in the second 
session the sooner rewards were available today. Our design also incorporates a test of 
rationality in the form of violations of the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference 
 
4 The seminal study investigating the lifelong impact of self-control is Walter Mischel’s 
“marshmallow” test (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989), but see 
McGuire & Kable (2013) and Cohen et al. (2020) for discussion of confounds in the interpretation of 
this task as a measure of time preference. Sutter et al. (2013) investigate the link between 
children’s and adolescents’ time preference for money and field behaviours, however they find 
little evidence of present bias in their sample. 
5 We conducted our experiment during regular class time toward the beginning of a new semester, 
and there were no public holidays during the timeline of our experiment. 
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(GARP). All 697 subjects who started the experiment completed both sessions, resulting in 
zero attrition.  
We highlight several key findings. First, we provide the first estimates of present bias for 
consumption rewards. On average, subjects choose to receive 4.2% more food on the sooner 
payment date when the decision is made on that day than when it is made in advance. Our 
structural estimate of 𝛽 for healthy food is 0.69 and for unhealthy food is 0.71 (both are 
significantly less than one). 
However, in contrast to most recent literature we also find strong present bias for money 
in our sample. Subjects choose to receive 7% more money on the sooner payment date when 
the decision is made on that day than when it is made in advance. Our structural estimate 
of 𝛽 for money is 0.65 (also significantly less than one). 
Next, in contrast to previous results in the domain of risk, we find differences in the 
curvature of utility between monetary and primary rewards. For money, we confirm recent 
findings in the time preference literature that instantaneous utility is close to linear 
(Abdellaoui et al., 2013; Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012a; Cheung, 2020). However, for both 
healthy and unhealthy foods we find strong evidence of concave utility (implying a 
preference to spread rewards evenly over time), more in line with conventional findings in 
the domain of risk. 
At an individual level, we find significantly positive and moderate correlations between 
individual measures of present bias for all reward type pairs (𝜌 ∈ (0.47, 0.60)), as well as 
between individual measures of impatience (𝜌 ∈ (0.59, 0.66)). Together, these findings imply 
that conventional choices over money are moderately predictive of choices for food. 
Turning to the correlation between experimental measures and field behaviours, our 
measures of time preferences from monetary rewards predict field behaviours better than 
estimates from food rewards. Adolescents who make less patient choices for money are 
more likely to drink alcohol, have lower BMI, and have worse academic performance. In 
addition, teenagers who are more present biased for money are more likely to drink alcohol 
and have lower grades.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes our experimental design, Section III 
explains our empirical approach, Section IV presents the results, and Section IV provides a 
discussion of our findings.  
 6 
Experimental Design 
Subject Pool  
We collected data from 697 adolescents (331 girls; average age 16.1 years, standard 
deviation 0.15 years) from four public high schools in Guiyang City, China in February and 
March 2019. We randomly selected 16 classes in tenth and eleventh grades to participate in 
the study. The University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee and principals of 
each collaborating high school approved the study. Teachers of the participating classes 
permitted the experiments to be conducted in class during regular school hours. No students 
opted out, and all participating students and their parents gave informed consent. The 
experiment was conducted in Mandarin (see Appendix 1 for an English translation of the 
instructions). 
Task 
Our experimental task is an extension of the convex time budget (CTB) design of Andreoni 
and Sprenger (2012a), which allows us to estimate subjects’ utility and discounting 
parameters using data from a single task. To simplify this task, we implement a discrete 
version of the CTB based upon Andreoni, Kuhn, & Sprenger (2015). 
Following the CTB framework, we provide options that allocate amounts of a reward 
between two payment dates subject to a future-value budget constraint: 
(1 + 𝑟) × 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡+𝑘 = 70, 
where ct denotes the amount of reward received at the sooner payment date t, ct+k denotes 
the amount of reward received at the later payment date t + k, and r denotes the simple 
interest rate between the two dates. Between trials, we systematically vary the interest 
rate r keeping the future value of the endowment fixed at 70. The back-end delay k was 
always equal to four weeks. 
 
Figure 1A shows a sample budget with an interest rate of 0%. In that case, regardless of 
which bundle a subject chooses, the amounts received on the two dates always sum to 70. 
To discretise this choice, we offer six evenly-spaced options (shown as dots in Figure 1A) 
along the budget line that a subject can choose from. There were always six options in every 
trial to keep the difficulty of the choices constant. We exclude corner bundles (i.e. (ct, 0) 
and (0, ct+k)) from the choice set, as previous studies find that subjects who consistently 
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choose corner bundles generate issues for structural estimation (Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 
2013).  
 
Figure 1B shows the corresponding decision screen for the 0% interest rate trial. As well as 
stating the amounts of a reward that are available on each payment date, we also visualise 
these quantities to facilitate comparison of the alternatives. The order of presentation of 
the six options on the screen was randomised for each subject, and the subject chose their 
most preferred bundle by clicking on it. 
[Insert Figure 1A and 1B here] 
The other simple interest rates we use are -9%, 11%, 25%, 43%, 67% and 100% (see Figure 2A 
for these seven budget sets). As the interest rate varies, a subject’s choices trace out a 
price expansion path in terms of sooner and later rewards, with the optimal choices 
depending upon both utility curvature and discounting parameters. 
 
We further enrich this framework by adding an additional seven decisions to allow for a test 
of the consistency of subjects’ choices with the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(Varian, 1982), as recommended by Chakraborty et al. (2017). We derive these additional 
choice sets from a present-value budget constraint: 
𝑐𝑡 +
1
1 + 𝑟
× 𝑐𝑡+𝑘 = 56. 
and in these trials we vary the interest rate while holding the present value of the 
endowment fixed at 56. The interest rates r for these additional trials are -13%, 0%, 13%, 
25%, 38%, 50%, and 63%. Figure 2B shows the complete set of budgets used in our design. 
The two sets of budget lines intersect one another, allowing us to count the number of times 
a subject’s choices violate GARP. The maximum number of GARP violations in this task is 
91, while a random chooser would be expected to commit 12 violations. Note also that the 
trial with a 25% interest rate is presented twice (with other trials interleaved in between), 
allowing us to check for the consistency of subjects’ choices when making the same decision 
twice.6  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 
6 Our design also includes two choice sets with a 0% interest rate (but different sized budgets), 
allowing for an examination of the income effect. 
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Timeline 
Figure 3 shows the timeline of our five-week longitudinal experiment. In the first session in 
week one, subjects were presented with decisions where the sooner payment is in one 
week’s time (hence in week two) and the later payment is in four weeks’ time (hence in 
week five). In the second session in week two, the same subjects made the same sets of 
decisions over bundles of rewards received in weeks two and five, where the sooner payment 
is now available today.7 This longitudinal design identifies dynamic inconsistency by 
comparing initial allocations in week one (when all rewards are in the future) with 
subsequent allocations in week two (when the sooner reward is in the present). Before 
making their decisions in week one, subjects were told that they would be making decisions 
again in week two, and that one out of all their decisions would be randomly selected at 
the end of session two to be realised for payment. In the third session which took place in 
week five, subjects did not make any decisions and only received rewards. The experiment 
dates were between 25 February and 29 March 2019. Over this period, there were no public 
holidays, school vacations or examinations. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
After completing their decisions, subjects filled out a questionnaire which included 
demographic characteristics (in the first session) as well as hunger, fatigue and appetite 
ratings (in both sessions); see Appendix 2 for an English translation of these questionnaires. 
 
Reward types 
To compare time preferences for monetary and food rewards, we use a within-subjects 
design. Each subject faced the same sets of choices for three different reward types: money, 
healthy food, and unhealthy food. Before making any choices in week one, we asked each 
subject to choose their preferred healthy food reward and preferred unhealthy reward from 
three alternatives in each category. We did this to cater for different tastes and hence 
ensure that all subjects made decisions for foods that they liked. For healthy food, the 
available options were pecans, raisins, and almonds. For unhealthy food, the options were 
Skittles, M&M’s, and Lays. We chose these food rewards based on a pre-experiment survey 
of students’ favourite snacks. 
 
 
7 Figure A3.1 in Appendix 3 shows sample choice screens of the same trial as faced by a subject in 
week one and week two, respectively; everything is the same except the delays until the reward 
dates. 
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To summarise, in a given session each subject made 14 decisions for each of three reward 
types, with all 42 decisions repeated in two separate sessions. The order of rewards was 
either healthy-money-unhealthy or unhealthy-money-healthy. This order was randomly 
selected for each subject in the first session, and then held constant for the second session. 
Thus, choices over the two food rewards were always separated by choices over money. The 
experimental interface was programmed using Qualtrics. 
Payment 
At the end of the second session, one decision of each subject (from either the first or 
second session) was randomly selected as the one that would count for payment. If this was 
a money trial, the payments were made in cash. If it was a food trial, the subject received 
the amounts of food they had chosen. Sooner payments (both money and food) were 
delivered one hour after the second session. In week five, research assistants returned to 
the schools at the same time as in week two to deliver the later payments. To protect 
privacy, regardless of reward type, we used non-transparent zip-lock bags to pack subjects’ 
payments. Therefore, monetary and food rewards were delivered to subjects in the same 
way.  
Since we conducted the experiment during regular class hours in schools, the transaction 
costs to participate and receive payments are equalised throughout the study. Moreover, 
since subjects need to come to school anyway we did not pay any additional show-up fee, 
and their compensation from the study was solely based on the choices that they made.  
Empirical approach 
We next outline two approaches we adopt to measure subjects’ time preferences and utility 
curvature. Our first approach is to use descriptive measures of time preference and 
preference for smoothness that are based on simple proportions of rewards allocated to 
sooner versus later payment dates. These descriptive measures provide evidence on the 
behaviours we are interested in without needing to commit to specific structural 
assumptions. However, since descriptive measures cannot always cleanly distinguish 
between parameters, our second approach is to impose a quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility 
model (Laibson, 1997) and use multinomial logit regression (Cheung, 2015; Harrison, Lau, & 
Rutström, 2013) to jointly estimate three parameters: the discount factor δ, present bias β, 
and utility curvature α. We find that these two approaches yield broadly consistent results. 
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Descriptive measures 
 
 Impatience 
To investigate subjects’ impatience, without confounding it with present bias, we consider 
decisions made in the first session (week one) which result in bundles of rewards received 
in weeks two and five. Since all rewards are received in the future, present bias does not 
play any role. Subjects who select a bundle with a larger proportion of rewards allocated to 
the sooner payment date (week two) relative to the later date (week five) can be classified 
as more impatient (equivalently less patient).  
Let ci,j be the amount of a reward that a subject would receive in week i based on a decision 
made in week j. We define impatience for each of the 14 decisions (Impatiencek, k ∈ [1,14]) 
for a given reward type as the proportion of the reward allocated to week two relative to 
the total amount of rewards in the chosen bundle, when the choice is made in week one:  
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑘 =  
𝑐2,1
𝑐2,1 + 𝑐5,1
 
Then, for each reward type separately, to measure an individual’s impatience we take the 
average of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑘 for that reward type over all 14 decisions:8 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
1
14
∑ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑘
14
𝑘=1
 
By construction, this measure takes values between zero (most patient) and one (most 
impatient). 
Present bias  
Present bias occurs when an individual allocates a larger proportion of a reward to the 
sooner date when the sooner payment is immediate relative to when it is delayed, other 
things equal. To construct a descriptive measure of present bias, we first compare an 
individual decision made in week two when the sooner payment is today to the same 
decision made in week one when the sooner payment is delayed. We thus define present 
bias for a given decision scenario (Present biask, k ∈ [1,14]) as the difference in the 
 
8 We acknowledge that impatience defined in this manner may be confounded with utility 
curvature. We address this issue in our structural estimation. 
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proportion of the reward allocated to week two when making a choice in week two 
compared to when making the same choice in week one: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑘 =  
𝑐2,2
𝑐2,2 + 𝑐5,2
− 
𝑐2,1
𝑐2,1 + 𝑐5,1
 
Then, for each reward type separately, to measure an individual’s present bias we take the 
average of Present biask for that reward type over all 14 decision scenarios: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 =
1
14
∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑘
14
𝑘=1
 
By construction, this measure takes values between negative one (most future biased) and 
one (most present biased). 
Preference for smoothness 
In addition to their time preferences, a subject’s choices in the experiment depend on the 
strength of their preference to smooth payoffs over time, as captured by the curvature of 
the utility function in a discounted utility model. A subject who has highly concave utility 
for a reward will have a strong preference for more mixed (temporally balanced) bundles, 
while one who has near-linear utility will tend to choose more extreme bundles near the 
corners of the budget set. To construct a descriptive measure of preference for smoothness, 
for a given decision trial (k ∈ [1,28]), we calculate the difference between the sum of the 
amounts of a reward allocated to both dates and the absolute difference in those amounts, 
normalised by the sum of the amounts: 
𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑘 =  
(𝑐1 + 𝑐2) − |(𝑐1 − 𝑐2)|
𝑐1 + 𝑐2
 
In the limiting case of a corner solution (where one of the cs is zero), the numerator 
collapses to zero and so Smoothk goes to zero. At the opposite extreme of perfect smoothing 
(such that c1 = c2), it is the absolute difference term that collapses to zero and so Smoothk 
goes to one. 
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Then, for each reward type separately, to measure an individual’s preference for 
smoothness we take the average of 𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑘 for that reward type over all 28 decision 
scenarios:9 
𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ =
1
28
∑ 𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑘
28
𝑘=1
 
By construction, this measure takes values between zero (no preference for smoothing) and 
one (maximum preference for smoothing). 
Structural model 
To conduct a parametric estimation of the discount factor, present bias, and utility 
curvature we assume a CRRA utility function and quasi-hyperbolic discount function 
(Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). The instantaneous utility from experimental 
payments, c, is: 
𝑢(𝑐) =  {
𝑐1−𝛼
1−𝛼
                   𝛼 ≠ 1
ln 𝑐                    𝛼 = 1
                            (1) 
The parameter α is CRRA utility curvature, where α = 0 indicates linear utility, and α > 0 
(α < 0) indicates concave (convex) utility. With a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, the 
intertemporal utility from experimental payments ct received at date t, and ct+k received 
at date t + k, is: 
𝑈𝑡(𝑐𝑡 ,  𝑐𝑡+𝑘) =  𝑢(𝑐𝑡) +  𝛽
𝟏𝑡=0𝛿𝑘𝑢(𝑐𝑡+𝑘)              (2) 
The parameter β captures present bias. When β = 1, the discount function is exponential 
and there is no present bias, while β < 1 indicates present bias. The variable 1t=0 is an 
indicator of when the sooner payment date, t, is immediate. The parameter δ is the weekly 
discount factor.  
 
Given the discrete nature of the choice sets in our design, we estimate this model using 
multinomial logit (MNL) regression (Cheung, 2015; Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2013) which 
compares the discounted utility of a subject’s chosen bundle to that of each of the available 
 
9 There is no significant difference in our measure of preference for smoothness between the two 
sessions within the same reward type, thus we use data from both sessions to construct this 
measure. 
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alternatives.10 Conditional on candidate values of the parameters being estimated, we use 
equations (1) and (2) to compute the discounted utility of each of the six alternative 
bundles. Then, given the bundle chosen by the subject, the multinomial logit probability of 
the observed choice is given by:  
Pr(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒) =
𝑒𝑈
∗/𝑠
𝑒𝑈1/𝑠+𝑒𝑈2/𝑠+⋯+𝑒𝑈6/𝑠
 , 
where U∗ represents the utility of the chosen bundle, s is a “noise” parameter, and Ui (i ∈
{1, 6}) represents the utilities of the six alternative bundles in each trial. The estimates of 
α, β and δ are chosen to maximise the log-likelihood of the observed choices, with standard 
errors clustered at the level of the subject.  
Results 
We present the results in four parts. We first establish that subjects’ choices are consistent 
and rational. We then analyse their time preferences (impatience and present bias) and 
utility curvature using both descriptive measures and structural estimates as defined in the 
previous section. Next, we explore the correlation between time preferences for monetary 
and food rewards. We conduct both in- and out-of-sample prediction analyses to examine 
to what extent choices for money predict choices for food and vice versa. Finally, we study 
the relationship between our experimental measures of time preferences and field 
behaviours: BMI, smoking, alcohol consumption, and academic performance.  
IV.A Consistency of subjects’ choices with GARP 
 
Table 1 shows the average number of GARP violations and Afriat’s critical cost efficiency 
index (Afriat, 1967) separately for the three reward types and two sessions. For a given 
reward type and session, the maximum number of possible GARP violations in our design is 
91. On average, subjects made 1.72 GARP violations for money, 1.71 for healthy food, and 
1.84 for unhealthy food. The number of violations did not significantly differ between any 
of the reward types or within a reward type between sessions. For all reward types, the 
Afriat index is 0.98. Although this is significantly less than 1 (p < 0.01), it is close to 1 
indicating that our subjects were highly rational. Moreover, their scores are higher than in 
previous studies with comparable age groups. Harbaugh, Krause, & Berry (2001) found 
 
10 Our conclusions are qualitatively unchanged if we instead apply the nonlinear least squares 
estimator used by Andreoni & Sprenger (2012a) for continuous CTB data. Representative agent 
results for this estimation technique are reported in Table A3.1 in Appendix 3. 
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Afriat’s index to be around 0.95 for children aged between 7 and 11 years, and around 0.94 
for undergraduates, both lower than in our study; their experiment design also involved 
discretised budget sets. Overall, we conclude that our subjects behaved in a highly rational 
manner allowing meaningful analysis of their preferences.11 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Time preferences 
Impatience 
In Figure 4, we plot mean impatience as a function of the interest rate.12 As the interest 
rate increases, subjects choose to receive less on the sooner date, consistent with the law 
of demand.13 Figure 4 suggests that subjects were less patient for food than for money. 
Averaged across all interest rates, subjects chose to receive 41.71% of their reward on the 
sooner payment date for money, 41.87% for healthy food and 41.80% for unhealthy food 
(detailed data in Table 2). Paired t-tests show that the differences in impatience between 
money and healthy food, and between money and unhealthy food, are both significant (p <
0.001, see Table 3), but that the difference between healthy and unhealthy food is only 
marginally significant (p = 0.084). Our finding that subjects tend to be less patient for 
primary rewards than for money is consistent with previous studies (Estle et al., 2007; 
Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 2006; Odum & Rainaud, 2003; Reuben et al., 2010; 
Tsukayama & Duckworth, 2010; Ubfal, 2016). 
[Insert Figure 4 and Tables 2 & 3 here] 
 
11 We also conduct a simple consistency check using the interest rate of 25% that was presented 
twice for each reward in each session. On average, within a given session, 81.2% of subjects chose 
either the same or a neighbouring bundle in both trials, with 56.6% of subjects choosing the exact 
same bundle both times. Across all sessions and rewards, the number of subjects who chose the 
same or a neighbouring bundle was very similar, ranging between 80.0% and 83.1%. There was no 
significant difference between the two sessions or between reward types. There was also no 
significant difference in the percentage of rewards that subjects allocate to the sooner date between 
the first and second time they face this question (40.3% versus 40.0%, p = 0.34). Overall, we 
conclude that our subjects show generally high levels of consistency. 
12 As there was no significant difference between the first and second trials for the repeated interest 
rate of 25%, we plot the average of these two trials in this graph. 
13 At an individual level, we regress impatience on the interest rate separately for each subject and 
find that for 436 subjects (62%), the coefficient on the interest rate is significant in line with the 
law of demand.   
 15 
In our structural estimates for a representative agent (Table 4), we find that δ > 1 for all 
three reward types (p < 0.001) which implies a negative discount rate. To understand this 
surprising finding, call a bundle back (front) loaded if in that bundle, a larger proportion of 
the reward is delivered at the later (sooner) date. In trials with a front-end delay (such that 
beta is not implicated in choices) and an interest rate of zero, a negative discount rate 
would manifest itself through subjects selecting back-loaded bundles.14 Indeed, in zero-
interest trials our subjects on average allocate 53.5% to the later date for money and 54% 
to the later date for healthy and unhealthy food, slightly more than an equal split of 50%. 
This behaviour is consistent with our estimate of δ > 1. Nonetheless, only 10.33% of our 
subjects choose the most back-loaded bundle for money (10.47% for healthy food and 9.76% 
for unhealthy food).15 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Present bias 
In Figure 5, we plot the proportion of the reward allocated to the sooner date against the 
interest rate, separately for each reward and session. Dots (squares) represent the 
proportion allocated to the sooner reward in the first (second) session and the solid (dashed) 
curve represents the predicted aggregate choice behaviour implied by our structural β − δ 
model in the first (second) session when we estimate reward-specific parameters of that 
model by MNL at an individual level and predict the choices that maximise each subject’s 
utility in each trial.16 The difference between allocations in the two sessions represents 
present bias. The more subjects are time consistent, the closer the solid and dashed curves 
will be. The fact that the dashed curve is above the solid one for all three reward types 
indicates that our subjects choose to receive more on the sooner date when the sooner date 
 
14 In a zero-interest rate trial with front-end delay, an agent with linear utility and a 0% discount 
rate (𝛿 = 1) would be indifferent between all bundles. An agent with linear utility and a negative 
discount rate (𝛿 > 1) would choose the most back-loaded bundle. Finally, if an agent has concave 
utility and a negative discount rate she would choose an interior back-loaded bundle. This last case 
is what we observe in our data. 
15 At the same time, only 7.6% of subjects choose the most front-loaded bundle for money (5.31% 
for healthy food, 5.02% for unhealthy food). By contrast, in zero interest rate trials with a front-
end delay, 73.2% of subjects in Andreoni & Sprenger (2012a) chose the soonest possible allocation, 
68.75% in the certainty condition in Andreoni & Sprenger (2012b), 66.67% in the certainty condition 
in Cheung (2015), 93.75% in Andreoni, Kuhn, & Sprenger (2015), and 63.33% in the money condition 
in Augenblick, Niederle, & Sprenger (2015). Each of these studies involved monetary rewards, and 
estimated 𝛿 < 1. 
16 See Section IV.C below for further discussion of these individual estimates.  
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is today compared to when it is in the future, with the distance between the curves 
indicating the strength of present bias.  
Our descriptive measures (Table 5 and Figure 5) indicate that present bias is strongest for 
money. The mean of our descriptive measure of present bias for money is 0.0700 (std.dev = 
0.28). That is, on average, subjects chose to allocate 7% more money to the sooner date in 
the second session. The mean of present bias for healthy food is 0.0426 (std.dev = 0.27) and 
for unhealthy food it is 0.0429 (std.dev = 0.27). Using paired t-tests we confirm a stronger 
present bias for money than for each primary reward (p < 0.001), and no significant 
difference in present bias between healthy and unhealthy food (p = 0.811) (Table 6).  
[Insert Figure 5 and Tables 5 & 6 here] 
In our structural estimates for a representative agent (Table 4, third column), we find 
economically and statistically significant present bias for all rewards, consistent with our 
descriptive analysis. For money we find β = 0.6574 (std. err. = 0.0356, H0: β = 1, p < 0.001), 
for healthy food β = 0.6959 (std. err = 0.0459, H0: β = 1, p < 0.001), and for unhealthy food 
β = 0.7161 (std. err = 0.0425, H0: β = 1, p < 0.001). In line with our descriptive measures, β 
is smallest (present bias is strongest) for money.  
Our finding of significant present bias for money differs from recent studies, including 
Andreoni & Sprenger (2012a), Andreoni, Kuhn, & Sprenger (2015), Andersen et al. (2014) 
and Augenblick, Niederle, & Sprenger (2015) who all conclude that there is no present bias 
for money. In the discussion section, we compare our design (study takes place at school 
during school hours) and subject pool (adolescents from a relatively poor background) with 
these studies and discuss potential reasons for this difference. 
We also find present bias for consumption goods which is a novel contribution of our study. 
To date, no other study has investigated present bias for primary rewards except 
Augenblick, Niederle, & Sprenger (2015) who estimate present bias for real effort (aggregate 
estimate of β = 0.888). Our estimates of β indicate stronger present bias for food than for 
real effort.  
Preference for smoothness / utility curvature 
We find a significantly stronger preference for smoothness for food rewards than for money 
(p < 0.001, Tables 7 & 8). The descriptive measure of preference for smoothness is around 
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0.59 for food rewards and for money it is around 0.56. A higher score for food indicates a 
stronger preference for more mixed bundles, and thus more concave utility for food rewards 
than for money. We do not find any difference in the preference for smoothness between 
healthy and unhealthy food.  
[Insert Tables 7 & 8 here] 
The conclusions of our structural estimation (Table 4) are consistent with this descriptive 
analysis. The estimated utility curvature for money is not significantly different from zero, 
indicating near-linear utility. This is consistent with findings in Andreoni & Sprenger (2012a), 
Abdellaoui et al. (2013), Andreoni, Kuhn, & Sprenger (2015), Augenblick, Niederle, & 
Sprenger (2015) and Cheung (2020). For both healthy and unhealthy food, we estimate 
significantly concave utility, indicating that our subjects have a preference to smooth food 
rewards over time.  
Relationship between time preferences for money and food rewards 
In aggregate, we find that subjects have different preferences for monetary and for food 
rewards. They are less patient, less present-biased, and have more concave utility for food 
than for money. In this subsection we use our descriptive measures of impatience, present 
bias, and utility curvature to understand the extent to which time preferences for money 
and food are correlated within each individual. Overall, we generally find moderate 
correlations across reward types. 
Using Spearman rank-order correlation analysis and descriptive measures of impatience, we 
find significantly positive, moderate correlations around 0.61 between individual 
impatience for all reward-type pairs (Figure 6 panel A). This means that individuals who 
made less patient choices for money also made less patient choices for food, and those who 
made less patient choices for unhealthy food also made less patient choices for healthy 
food. Panel B of Figure 6 illustrates the correlations between individual descriptive 
measures of present bias for different reward types. They are also significant and moderate 
at around 0.60. Preference for smoothness is a proxy for utility curvature. As shown in Figure 
6 Panel C the correlation between any two reward types is significant and strong (around 
0.82).  
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
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We next investigate to what extent the structural estimates for one reward type predict 
choices for the others. Since most studies in experimental economics rely on monetary 
incentives, it is important to understand the validity of extrapolating from such studies to 
different reward domains. We answer this question in two steps. First, we validate our 
structural estimation in sample. In other words, we ask to what extent our individual 
structural estimates for a given reward type predict choices for the same individual and 
reward type. We then use this as a benchmark to assess out-of-sample prediction in the 
second step.  
In Figure 7A and 7B, first row, we plot the observed choice distributions in the first and 
second sessions, separately for each reward type. Bundles 1 to 6 are indexed according to 
their relative position along the budget line, with 1 being the most front-loaded and 6 the 
most back-loaded bundle within any given choice set. We see that in the first session, the 
choice distribution is similar for the two food rewards with bundle 3 being the modal choice. 
For monetary rewards, the modal choice is bundle 6 which allocates most to the later date, 
consistent with the finding that subjects are less patient for food than for money. In the 
second session, owing to present bias, the tendency to choose bundles 1 and 2 (allocating 
more to the sooner date) increases for all reward types. We also see that bundles 1 and 6 
are less frequently chosen for food than for money, consistent with the finding that subjects 
have a stronger preference to smooth food rewards over time. 
To examine how well our structural estimates explain an individual’s choices for the same 
reward type (in-sample prediction), we calculate the utility of each bundle in each trial 
using each individual’s reward-specific structural estimates, and predict that the individual 
will choose the bundle with the highest utility in each trial. As illustrated in the second row 
of Figure 7A and 7B, this predicts the general tendency to pick each bundle type quite well. 
Across all three reward types, we exactly predict 56.98% of individual choices in the first 
session and 57.07% of choices in the second.17 This is our benchmark to compare the ability 
of estimates based on choices over money to predict choices over food. 
The third row of Figure 7A and 7B presents our out-of-sample predicted choice distributions. 
We use our individual structural estimates for money to calculate the utility of each bundle 
in each food trial, and predict that an individual will select the bundle with the highest 
 
17 If we relax the standard of success to predicting either the chosen bundle or an immediately 
adjacent one, this is achieved for 84.20% of choices in the first session, and 84.12% of choices in 
the second. 
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utility.18 In the first session we now correctly predict 43.63% of choices for food, while in 
the second session we correctly predict 46.01%. Table 9 confirms that prediction 
performance is indeed significantly worse when we use estimates from choices over money 
to predict choices over food (p < 0.001 in both sessions).19  
[Insert Figure 7 and Table 9 here] 
Experimental measures and field behaviours 
In this section, we assess the predictive power of our descriptive measures of impatience 
and present bias to explain smoking, alcohol consumption, body mass index (BMI), and 
academic performance. Information on smoking, alcohol consumption and BMI was collected 
through self-reports from all 697 adolescents. Grades for the three core units (Chinese, 
Mathematics, and English) were obtained from the administrative records of the 
participating high schools.  
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
Figure 8 summarises our data on BMI and academic performance. 59% of our subjects have 
BMI in the normal range (18.5 ≤ BMI ≤ 24.9), while 28% are underweight and 13% are 
overweight (mean BMI = 21.21, 75th percentile = 22.04, std. dev. = 4.88). Academic 
performance in China is assessed on a scale from 0 to 100; we combine the grades in the 
three core units by summing them. An average student in our sample obtained a combined 
grade of 167 (std. dev = 29.38) and the highest score is 237.5 (around 80%), indicating 
medium to low academic performance in our sample. Very few subjects (7.174%) reported 
smoking cigarettes and 13.63% reported drinking alcohol.  
To establish if there is any relationship between time preferences and field behaviour, we 
separately regress each of the field behaviours on the domain specific descriptive measures 
of impatience (Table 10) and present bias (Table 11). In these regressions, we control for 
subjects’ gender, self-reported wealth, hunger, fatigue, and trust in the experimenter. 
Tables 10 and 11 report the coefficients on each of the domain specific descriptive measures 
while the coefficients on the control variables are omitted from these tables.  
 
18 This procedure implies that each food bundle type will be chosen equally often as the 
corresponding bundle type in the monetary domain. 
19 Figure A3.2 in Appendix 3 report results on the ability of preferences estimated from choices over 
food rewards to predict choices over money. 
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The most prominent associations we find are between the domain-specific impatience 
measures and alcohol. Adolescents who made less patient choices for money, healthy food 
or unhealthy food were more likely to drink alcohol. Moreover, adolescents who were less 
patient for money and unhealthy food had lower grades. Directionally, we see the same 
relationship between grades and impatience for healthy food, however it is not significant 
and the coefficient is much smaller. Very few adolescents in our sample report smoking, 
which is likely why we do not find any significant relationship between impatience and 
smoking. Subjects who were less patient in the monetary domain had lower BMI (p = 0.028). 
We found fewer associations between present bias and field behaviours. Subjects who were 
more present biased for money were more likely to smoke, drink alcohol and had lower 
grades. Those who were more present biased for healthy food had lower BMI.  
To summarise, across the four field behaviours, our measures of patience have stronger 
associations with field behaviours than our measures of present bias. Time preferences for 
money predict more field behaviours than food rewards. We explore the implications of 
these findings in the discussion.  
[Insert Tables 10 & 11 here] 
Discussion 
The model of present-biased time preference is one of the cornerstones of behavioural 
economics. In this paper, we provide evidence that fills some major gaps in empirical 
research on this model. Using data from an incentivised, within-subjects, longitudinal 
experiment in Chinese high schools, we estimate and compare present-bias, patience, and 
utility curvature for three types of rewards: money, unhealthy food, and healthy food. While 
researchers have applied the quasi-hyperbolic discount model to explain sub-optimal 
decision-making in a wide variety of domains, to date empirical evidence of present bias 
parameters has come predominantly from experiments using money, with many recent 
studies finding no present bias for money (Andersen et al., 2014; Andreoni, Kuhn, & 
Sprenger, 2015; Andreoni & Sprenger, 2012a; Augenblick, Niederle, & Sprenger, 2015). This 
raises the possibility that either present bias is not the right behavioural model, or that 
present bias is not a feature of the samples and/or rewards used in these studies. While a 
handful of studies (such as those conducted in developing countries) address the diversity 
of the sample, ours is the first to provide estimates of present bias for consumption rewards.  
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We find strong present bias for food rewards. In our experiment, subjects on average 
allocate 4% more food to the sooner date when that date is today rather than in the future. 
Structural estimates yield a present-bias parameter of 0.70. To give an indication of the 
consequences of such preferences, we calculated the caloric intake of our subjects, 
assuming that they take part in the same experiment every week and compared it to the 
caloric intake of choosers with no present bias. Compared to time-consistent choosers, our 
subjects would consume around 120 more calories each week just from our experiment, 
resulting in 0.79 kilograms increase in weight per year. Holding all else constant, an average 
high-school student with BMI = 21 would become overweight in less than 5 years. This 
estimate should be regarded as a lower bound, as it does not incorporate other dietary 
choices that subjects also make that may involve more temptation. In line with this 
intuition, Vadeboncoeur, Townsend, & Foster (2015) found that university students can gain 
up to 4kg in their first year of study, which coincides with the time in life when they start 
to take responsibility for their own nutrition. 
Our finding of present bias for money is also notable. While theoretical studies have applied 
the quasi-hyperbolic model to explain sub-optimal decision-making across a variety of 
domains, most recent empirical studies do not find present bias for monetary rewards. We 
use the same rigorous preference elicitation methods as these studies, but find present bias 
for money. These contrasting results could be due to differences in the subject pool or to 
details of the experiment. Instead of university students, our sample consists of Chinese 
adolescents of low-to-medium socioeconomic status. Their age, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic status differ from the subjects in most previous studies. With regard to 
experimental protocols, we conducted our experiment at schools during regular school 
hours, whereas subjects in most other studies had to take the initiative to sign up for the 
experiment and then come to the lab on time. We argue that this latter procedure may 
generate selection bias, as subjects who are able to show up to a previously scheduled 
experimental session on time are likely to have good self-control which may explain why 
previous studies do not find present bias.  
Our findings regarding the curvature of utility are notable in light of recent controversy over 
the nature of utility in choice over time (Abdellaoui et al., 2013; Andreoni & Sprenger, 
2012a; Cheung, 2020). Consistent with these recent studies, we find near-linear utility for 
money in choice over time. This finding stands in sharp contrast to experimental findings in 
the domain of risk, as well as the long tradition in theory (starting with Bernoulli) that 
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assumes concave utility in choice under risk, and the strong psychological (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) and biological foundations of S-shaped utility functions (Rayo & Becker, 2007; 
Robson & Whitehead, 2020; Tymula & Glimcher, 2020; Woodford, 2012). In contrast, we 
find concave utility for unhealthy and healthy foods in choice over time. This further 
underscores the importance of studying different reward domains rather than drawing 
strong inferences from the study of a single domain alone, namely money. 
An important question in behavioural economics is to what extent can we extrapolate 
findings from studies involving monetary rewards to other domains of decision making. In 
our experiment, we use an identical method to elicit preferences of each subject for three 
reward types, allowing for a meaningful within-subject comparison of estimates across 
rewards. Our within-subject correlations of present bias across reward types are significant 
but only moderate. Correlations between impatience for money and food can also be 
classified as moderate, consistent with a study by Reuben et al. (2010). Our results suggest 
that researchers should be cautious in extrapolating from studies of present bias and 
patience for money to other domains, at the very least more cautious than when doing so 
for risk preference.  
Our data allow us to relate elicited preference measures to field behaviours including self-
reported BMI, smoking and alcohol consumption, as well as academic performance obtained 
from schools’ administrative records. We find that subjects who are less patient and more 
present biased for money are more likely to drink alcohol and have lower grades, leading to 
an overall less favourable health and economic outlook compared to subjects who are more 
patient and less present biased. Similar findings have been found by Sutter et al. (2013). 
Compared to measures of impatience and present bias for money, impatience and present 
bias for food are less predictive of field behaviours. Only the discount rate for unhealthy 
food is associated with alcohol consumption and academic performance. 
Finally, while we have framed our paper in the language of the quasi-hyperbolic discount 
model, we note that our findings are also compatible with other hyperbolic discounting 
models and may thus be interpreted as evidence of time-inconsistent preferences more 
generally.20  
 
 
20 For biological foundations of different discount models, see Kable & Glimcher (2007). 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Experimental design. A: Budget constraint with 0% interest rate. The six dots on the 
budget line indicate bundles available to the chooser. B: Decision screen for the 0% interest 
rate trial. Each row represents one bundle. On the left is the amount received on the sooner 
date and on the right is the later date. Dots represent the quantity of a reward to be received 
on that date. The six bundles are presented in random order for each participant.  
A. 
 
B.  
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Figure 2. Budget constraints 
 
A. Seven standard budget constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Complete set of budget constraints 
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Figure 3. Timeline of the experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
week one week five 
? ? 
? ? 
week two 
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Figure 4. Impatience for different reward types at different interest rates. Dots (squares, crosses) 
represent the proportion allocated to the sooner reward in the first session for money (healthy 
food, unhealthy food). Solid (dashed, dash-dotted) curves are the 𝛽 − 𝛿 prediction (individual 
MNL) for money (healthy food, unhealthy food). 
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Figure 5. Present bias. Dots (squares) represent the proportion allocated to the sooner reward in 
week one (two) session. Solid (dashed) curves are the 𝛽 − 𝛿 prediction (individual MNL) for 
week one (two) session. The difference between allocations in the week one and two sessions 
represents present bias. 
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Figure 6. Correlations of individual descriptive measures of impatience, present bias and preference for 
smoothness across reward types. The line is the best linear fitted line. 
A. Impatience 
 
 
B. Present bias  
 
 
C. Preference for smoothness / utility curvature  
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Figure 7. In- and out-of-sample prediction. Bars illustrate the proportion of choices of each 
bundle type (1 is the most front-loaded bundle and 6 is the most back-loaded). The first row 
shows the observed choice distributions. The second row shows the in-sample predicted 
choice distributions. The third row shows the out-of-sample predicted choice distributions. 
A.  
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B.  
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Figure 8. Summary statistics for field behaviours. A: Histogram of BMI, calculated by dividing 
self-reported weight (in kilograms) by height (in metres) squared. The area between the red 
vertical lines indicates the healthy range of BMI (18.5 to 24.9). B: Histogram of academic 
performance (sum of grades for Chinese, Mathematics and English), obtained from schools’ 
administrative data.  
A.                
 
B.  
 
 
  
 35 
Table 1. Average number of GARP violations and Afriat’s index for different reward types 
in each session 
 
  Average no. of GARP violations Afriat’s index 
 Money 1.68 0.98 
1st session Healthy 1.65 0.98 
 Unhealthy 1.78 0.98 
 Money 1.75 0.98 
2nd session Healthy 1.77 0.98 
 Unhealthy 1.90 0.98 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of individual descriptive measures of impatience, by reward 
type 
 
 Mean Sd 25th 75th 
Money 0.4171 0.2462 0.1600 0.5714 
Healthy 0.4187 0.2332 0.1975 0.5714 
Unhealthy 0.4180 0.2332 0.1935 0.5714 
 
Table 3. Significance tests of differences in impatience between reward types 
 
Impatience difference Means difference Two-sided t-test p-value 
Healthy - Money 0.0016 0.0000 
Unhealthy - Money 0.0009 0.0000 
Healthy - Unhealthy 0.0007 0.0842 
 
Table 4. Structural estimation results (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 𝛼 𝛽 𝛿 
Money 
-0.0330 
(0.0797) 
0.6574 
(0.0356) 
1.0809 
(0.0142) 
Healthy 
0.3160 
(0.0850) 
0.6959 
(0.0459) 
1.1198 
(0.0234) 
Unhealthy 
0.2983 
(0.0857) 
0.7161 
(0.0425) 
1.1142 
(0.0212) 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics of individual descriptive measures of present bias, by reward 
type 
 
 Mean Sd 25th 75th 
Money 0.0700 0.2839  0.0000 0.2600 
Healthy 0.0426 0.2729 -0.1143 0.1556 
Unhealthy 0.0429 0.2719 -0.1238 0.1556 
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Table 6. Significance tests of differences in present bias between reward types 
 
Present bias difference Means difference Two-sided t-test p-value 
Healthy - Money -0.0263 0.0000 
Unhealthy - Money -0.0266 0.0000 
Healthy - Unhealthy -0.0008 0.8111 
 
Table 7. Summary statistics of individual descriptive measures of preference for 
smoothness, by reward type  
 
 Mean Sd 25th 75th 
Money 0.5626 0.1867 0.4020 0.7086 
Healthy 0.5953 0.1924 0.4388 0.7524 
Unhealthy 0.5950 0.1929 0.4391 0.7564 
 
Table 8. Significance tests of differences in preference for smoothness between reward 
types 
 
Preference for smooth difference Means difference Two-sided t-test p-value 
Healthy - Money 0.0328 0.0001 
Unhealthy - Money 0.0325 0.0001 
Healthy - Unhealthy 0.0002 0.9418 
 
Table 9. Paired t-tests for out-of-sample prediction performance. 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡_𝑚: prediction performance using estimates for money to predict choices on healthy 
food or unhealthy food.  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡_ℎ: prediction performance using estimates for healthy food 
to predict choices on healthy food. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡_𝑢: prediction performance using estimates for 
unhealthy food to predict choices on unhealthy food. 
 
  Mean Std. Err. 95% C.I. 𝐻0: 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 < 0 
1st session 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑚
− 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ  
-1.847 0.139 [-2.118, -1.575] 0.0001 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑚
− 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑢  
-1.760 0.141 [-2.036, -1.484] 0.0001 
2nd session 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑚
− 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡ℎ  
-1.613 0.125 [-1.858, -1.367] 0.0001 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑚
− 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑢  
-1.407 0.126 [-1.656, -1.159] 0.0001 
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Table 10. Relationship between impatience and field behaviours.  
In each regression, the measure of field behaviour is regressed on the descriptive measure of 
impatience (coefficient reported) and control variables (coefficients not reported). 
 
 BMI Smoking Alcohol Grades 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 
-2.9260* 
(1.3319) 
-0.0056 
(0.0823) 
0.1931* 
(0.0961) 
-15.6889+ 
(8.3544) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 
0.6965 
(1.2145) 
-0.0032 
(0.0798) 
0.1549+ 
(0.0893) 
-8.5180 
(7.6845) 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 
-1.8314 
(1.2865) 
0.0379 
(0.0806) 
0.2624** 
(0.0947) 
-14.5334+ 
(8.0058) 
Controls: gender, wealth, hunger, fatigue, and trust in the experimenter 
 
Table 11. Relationship between present bias and field behaviours.  
In each regression, the measure of field behaviour is regressed on the descriptive measure of 
present bias (coefficient reported) and control variables (coefficients not reported). 
 
 BMI Smoking Alcohol Grades 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 
0.1324 
(0.8719) 
0.0828+ 
(0.0501) 
0.1305+ 
(0.0712) 
   -10.8028+ 
(5.9393) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦  
-1.6885* 
(0.8101) 
-0.0172 
(0.0551) 
0.0407 
(0.0698) 
-9.2827 
(6.4625) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 
-0.4986 
(1.0099) 
0.0228 
(0.0554) 
-0.0063 
(0.0720) 
-7.9320 
(6.2758) 
Controls: gender, wealth, hunger, fatigue, and trust in the experimenter 
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Appendix 1  
Instructions translated to English. In the experiment, instructions are in Mandarin.  
 
A. Instructions in week one session 
 
Opening instructions 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in today's study with the School of Economics, 
The University of Sydney. The School of Economics has a no deception policy when 
undertaking experimental studies. This session will run for around 60 minutes. As the 
session progresses you will be updated with instructions on what will be involved in the next 
part. Please let the supervisor know if you do not understand something along the way by 
raising your hand. 
 
The choices you are making during the study are important because some of your payment 
will be based on them. There are no wrong choices in this experiment. We will ask you to 
state your preferences, and by responding truthfully, you make sure that you receive your 
preferred payment. 
 
In this study you will be asked to choose between options that involve receiving different 
quantities of food or money in one week and in four weeks from today. One of your choices 
from either this week’s decisions or next week’s decisions will be paid out for real. 
 
Food preference 
Some of your choices will be for different quantities of food, and others will be for different 
amounts of money. We would like you to receive a food that you like which is why we ask 
you to choose your preferred food from the options that we offer. It is in your best interest 
to pick the food you like most, because this is the food that you will be making choices 
about in the experiment. 
 
Task instructions 
Suppose, you picked almonds as your preferred food. You will be deciding between 
different amounts of almonds received in one week and in four weeks from today. There are 
six options available one in each of the six rows. Which one do you prefer?  The picture 
below is just an example and thus you cannot click the buttons now. 
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If this was the decision scenario selected to count towards your payment:  
 
• if you pick the first row, you will get 40 almonds in one week and 30 almonds in four 
weeks from today. 
• if you pick the last row, you will get 60 almonds in one week and 10 almonds in four 
weeks from today. 
 
Similarly, for the other options. In the real task, you can let us know which option you want 
by clicking the corresponding row shown on your screen. 
 
In the study you will make many choices like this. Your task is to choose which one of the six 
options you like most in each decision.   
 
There are no wrong decisions. Everybody has different preferences, so pick the option you 
like most remembering that each choice may be the one that counts towards your payment. 
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Payment 
At the end of next week's session, one of your choices from either this week's decisions or 
next week's decisions will be randomly selected by the computer and will determine your 
payment. You will receive your rewards based on the choice you made in that decision. 
 
Payment example  
Suppose that you are paid based on this decision and you chose the fourth row: 
 
 
 
In one week, you would receive 42 Skittles; and in four weeks, you would receive 10 Skittles. 
 
Task 
You will now be given 42 choices to complete. Remember one of these choices may be paid 
out at the end of next week’s session.  
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B. Instructions in week two session 
 
Opening instructions 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in today's study with the School of Economics, 
The University of Sydney. The School of Economics has a no deception policy when 
undertaking experimental studies. This session will run for around 60 minutes. As the 
session progresses you will be updated with instructions on what will be involved in the next 
part. Please let the supervisor know if you do not understand something along the way by 
raising your hand. 
The choices you are making during the study are important because some of your payment 
will be based on them. There are no wrong choices in this experiment. We will ask you to 
state your preferences, and by responding truthfully, you make sure that you receive your 
preferred payment. 
In this study you will be asked to choose between options that involve receiving different 
quantities of food or money today and in three weeks from today. One of your choices from 
either this week’s decisions or last week’s decisions will be paid out for real. 
 
Task instructions 
Suppose, you picked almonds as your preferred food. You are deciding between different 
amounts of almonds received today and in three weeks. There are six options available 
represented by six rows. Which one do you prefer?  The picture below is just an example 
and thus you cannot click the buttons now. 
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If this was the decision that has been chosen to count towards your payment:  
• If you pick the first row, you will get 40 almonds today and 30 almonds in three 
weeks from today. 
• If you pick the last row, you will get 60 almonds today and 10 almonds in three 
weeks from today. 
 
Similarly for the other options. In the real task, you can let us know which one you want by 
clicking the corresponding row on your screen. 
 
In the study you will make many choices like this. Your task is to choose which one of the six 
options you like most in each decision.   
 
There are no wrong decisions. Everybody has different preferences, so pick the option you 
like most remembering that each choice may be the one that counts towards your payment. 
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Payment 
At the end of this session, one of your choices from either this week's decisions or last 
week's decisions will be randomly selected by the computer and that will determine your 
payment. You will receive your rewards based on the choice you made in that decision. 
 
Payment example  
Suppose that you are paid based on this decision scenario and you chose the last row: 
 
 
Today, you would receive 32 Chinese Yuan, and in three weeks, you would receive 10 
Chinese Yuan. 
 
Task 
You will now be given 42 choices to complete. Remember one of these choices or one of 
your choices from last week’s decisions will be paid out at the end of this session. 
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Appendix 2  
 
Questionnaires translated to English. In the experiment, questionnaires are in Mandarin.  
 
A. Questionnaire in week one session 
 
Rate yourself on the following characteristics: 
 
1) How hungry do you feel? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
I am not hungry at all ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ I have never been more hungry 
 
2) How full do you feel? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Not at all full ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ Totally full 
 
3) How much do you think you can eat now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Nothing at all ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ A lot 
 
4) Would you like to eat something sweet now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
5) Would you like to eat something salty now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
6) Would you like to eat something savoury now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
7) Would you like to eat something fatty now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
 
 
Please rate your selected M&M’s( Skittles / Lays) on its characteristics: 
 
1) Visual appeal: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
2) Smell: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
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3) Taste, independent of any health considerations: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
4) Aftertaste: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
5) Healthiness, independent of any taste considerations: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
6) How much would you enjoy your selected food right now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
 
 
 
Please rate your selected pecans ( raisins / almonds) on its characteristics: 
 
1) Visual appeal: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
2) Smell: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
3) Taste, independent of any health considerations: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
4) Aftertaste: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
5) Healthiness, independent of any taste considerations: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
6) How much would you enjoy your selected food right now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
              Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
Please rate your happiness with the following situations: 
1) I will be paid in cash:          
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
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                 Very happy ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ Not happy at all 
 
2) I will be paid in M&M’s( / Skittles / Lays):  
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                 Very happy ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ Not happy at all 
 
3) I will be paid in pecans (/raisins/almonds): 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                 Very happy ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ Not happy at all 
 
About yourself: 
1) I am a: boy   girl 
2) I was born on …………………………………………………. (day/month/year) 
3) I am ………………….. years old 
4) Which year are you in? …………………………… 
5) My height is ………………. (cm) 
6) My weight is ………………. (kg) 
7) How many siblings do you have? ………………………….. 
8) How many younger siblings do you have? ………………………….. 
9) Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always shows great 
patience? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
        Very impatient ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚      Very patient 
 
10) Do you agree with the following statement? 
“I live for today and do not think about tomorrow.” 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
      Totally disagree ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚      Totally agree 
 
11) How wealthy do you consider yourself? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
      Very poor ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚      Very wealthy 
 
12) How much do you trust the experimenter would pay you exactly as showed in the 
experiment? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
      No, not at all ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚      Yes, very much 
 
13) In the last 5 hours, what did you eat? Please specify the name and quantity of food 
that you have eaten (e.g. bacon and egg roll – one, apples – two, chips – 1 bag, apple 
juice – 1 cup).  
 
Name of food Quantity of food 
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B. Questionnaire in week two session 
 
Rate yourself on the following characteristics: 
1) How hungry do you feel? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
I am not hungry at all ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ I have never been more hungry 
 
2) How full do you feel? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Not at all full ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ Totally full 
 
3) How much do you think you can eat now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Nothing at all ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ A lot 
 
4) Would you like to eat something sweet now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
5) Would you like to eat something salty now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
6) Would you like to eat something savoury now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
7) Would you like to eat something fatty now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
 
Please rate your selected M&M’s( Skittles / Lays) on its characteristics: 
 
1) Visual appeal: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
2) Smell: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
3) Taste, independent of any health considerations: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
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4) Aftertaste: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
5) Healthiness, independent of any taste considerations: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
6) How much would you enjoy your selected food right now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
 
Please rate your selected pecans (raisins / almonds) on its characteristics: 
 
1) Visual appeal: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
2) Smell: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
3) Taste, independent of any health considerations: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
4) Aftertaste: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
 
5) Healthiness, independent of any taste considerations: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                        Good ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚         Bad 
 
6) How much would you enjoy your selected food right now? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Yes, very much ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ No, not at all 
 
 
 
Please rate your happiness with the following situations: 
1) I will be paid in cash:          
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
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                 Very happy ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ Not happy at all 
 
2) I will be paid in M&M’s( / Skittles / Lays): 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                 Very happy ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ Not happy at all 
 
3) I will be paid in pecans (/raisins/almonds): 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
                 Very happy ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ Not happy at all 
 
About yourself: 
1) Do you agree with the following statement? 
“I live for today and do not think about tomorrow.” 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
      Totally disagree ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚      Totally agree 
 
2) Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always shows great 
patience? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
        Very impatient ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚      Very patient 
 
3) How wealthy do you consider yourself? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
      Very poor ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚      Very wealthy 
 
4) How much do you trust the experimenter would pay you exactly as showed in the 
experiment? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
      No, not at all ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚ ⊚      Yes, very much 
 
5) In the last 5 hours, what did you eat? Please specify the name and quantity of food 
that you have eaten (e.g. bacon and egg roll – one, apples – two, chips – 1 bag, apple 
juice – 1 cup).  
 
Name of food Quantity of food 
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Appendix 3  
 
Table A3.1 Structural estimation results using nonlinear least squares technique (standard 
errors in parentheses). 
 
 𝛼 𝛽 𝛿 
Money 
0.5994 
(0.0211) 
0.8456 
(0.0158) 
1.0338 
(0.0053) 
Healthy 
0.7072 
(0.0258) 
0.8852 
(0.0183) 
1.0350 
(0.0061) 
Unhealthy 
0.7202 
(0.0280) 
0.8820 
(0.0180) 
1.0408 
(0.0061) 
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Figure A3.1  
A. Sample choice screen in week one 
session 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Sample choice screen in week two 
session 
 52 
Figure A3.2.1 In-sample and out-of-sample prediction using structural time preference 
estimates for healthy food. The bars illustrate the proportion of choices of each type of 
bundle (1 has the largest sooner reward and 6 has the largest later reward among the six 
available alternatives). The first row shows the observed choice distributions in the sample. 
The second row shows the in-sample predicted choice distributions. The third row shows 
the out-of-sample predicted choice distributions. Across all three reward types, we can 
predict either the chosen bundle or an immediately adjacent one 74.28% (72.77%) for 
money (unhealthy food) in the first session and 75.99.07% (75.57%) for money (unhealthy 
food) in the second. Out-of-sample performance for money is not significantly different 
from that for unhealthy food in the first (𝑝 = 0.314) and second (𝑝 = 0.767) session. 
 
A. 
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B.  
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Figure A3.2.2 In-sample and out-of-sample prediction using structural time preference 
estimates for unhealthy food. The bars illustrate the proportion of choices of each type of 
bundle (1 has the largest sooner reward and 6 has the largest later reward among the six 
available alternatives). The first row shows the observed choice distributions in the sample. 
The second row shows the in-sample predicted choice distributions. The third row shows 
the out-of-sample predicted choice distributions. Across all three reward types, we can 
predict either the chosen bundle or an immediately adjacent one 73.66% (69.74) for money 
(healthy food) in the first session and 75.36% (75.63%) for money (healthy food) in the 
second. Out-of-sample performance for money is significantly better than that for 
unhealthy food in the first session(𝑝 = 0.008) but is not significantly different from that 
for unhealthy food in the second session (𝑝 = 0.850). 
 
A. 
 
 
  
 55 
B.  
 
 
 
 
 
